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Abstract
The aim of this report is to critically review, in the light of recent economic geog-
raphy theory, various strategies often suggested for developing the outermost regions
of Europe. In so doing, we point out pitfalls and bring to the foreground various
relatively neglected aspects. The key messages are as follows. First, insularity, dif-
ficult topography and climate, and exposure to natural disasters are not, in fine,
insurmountable obstacles to economic development. Yet, a small internal market and
excessive reliance on homogeneous products traded in increasingly integrated world
markets most certainly are. Second, alleviating remoteness by simply improving in-
frastructure may backfire, which is one of the main lessons from economic geogra-
phy. Improvements and development efforts in infrastructure and communications
technologies should, therefore, be combined with policies targeting at enhancing and
developing relatively immobile local resources, both physical and human.
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1 Introduction
Developing the seven outermost, or ultra-peripheral, regions of Europe (the French overseas
departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands) is an explicit objective of the
European Union, as stipulated by Article 299.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. It is
also an integral part of a broader social cohesion objective (Article 2 of the Treaty on
European Union), made precise in a regional context by Article 130a of the Amsterdam
Treaty which stipulates that the “community shall aim at reducing disparities between the
levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured
regions or islands, including rural areas.” The Treaty explicitly foresees that this will be
achieved by financial transfers from the EU budget and through lending by the European
Investment Bank. Considering only the amounts allocated in the regional programmes over
the period 2000–2006 as either Structural Funds or National Matching Funds, over e13
billion have been injected into the economies of these regions. In terms of investment, and
compared with gross fixed-capital formation in 1997, this represents about one third of
total regional investment in the Portuguese regions and the French overseas departments,
and almost one fifth in the Canary Islands. Despite such a significant financial effort,
developing the least favored regions and achieving the cohesion objective is a challenging
task as the empirical evidence suggests that regional policies may not deliver the expected
outcomes (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Puga, 2002). This seems to be especially true for the
outermost regions of Europe, which are known to cumulate several structural handicaps:
(i) remoteness from the continent ; (ii) small size; (iii) insularity; (iv) difficult topography
and climate; (v) exposure to natural disasters; and (vi) reliance on a few products only. In
this report, we focus on handicaps listed under (i), (ii) and (vi) as these are in the reach of
economic policy. It is nevertheless worth pointing out that, although the other handicaps
are beyond the reach of economic policy, they do not constitute per se an insurmountable
obstacle to economic development. Several regions of the world characterized by insularity,
difficult topography and climate, and exposure to natural disasters have indeed overcome
these obstacles and developed quite rapidly.1 In addition, the outermost regions of Europe
enjoy quite favorable natural conditions in terms of, e.g., geothermal resources, sunshine,
and regular winds, which can boost the development of the bioenergetic sector. However,
we will not say more on these issues in this report because their analysis would take us too
1Japan is an especially illuminating example of a country having developed rapidly despite insularity,
difficult topography, and exposure to natural disasters. Several other islands, cumulating partly the same
structural handicaps than the outermost regions of Europe, have developed by offering favorable financial
and fiscal environments (e.g., Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Bahamas). Yet, since the ultra-peripheral
regions are an integral part of the European Union, a development strategy based on preferential fiscal
conditions is not available as it is fundamentally incompatible with the single market.
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far from the main purpose of this paper.
The economic effects of handicaps listed under (i) and (ii) are well known. On the one
hand, remoteness is expected to create a locational disadvantage because of high distances
to input and output markets, thus implying significant additional production costs. On
the other hand, the small economic size of the ultra-peripheral regions prevents them from
achieving economies of scale and maps into a relative economic dependence on a few prod-
ucts. The effects of remoteness could be partly improved upon, at least from an economic
perspective, by gradually reducing the frictions to moving goods, people, and information
via infrastructure and information and communication technologies (ICT). Promoting ac-
cessibility between the outermost regions and the European continent is cleary an objective
pursued by the European Union. Doing so may, however, backfire as reducing spatial
frictions usually affects both directions of movement and may, therefore, lead to quite un-
expected results. This aspect is developed in the next section and has to be clearly borne in
mind when designing economic policy. It constitutes one of the main messages of economic
geography and of this report.
The real challenge for developing the outermost regions consists therefore, in our opinion,
in improving upon the conditions under which competitiveness and the product range can
be boosted. This point is detailed in Section 3. We will see, in particular, that reductions
in internal transport costs increase market size and profitability, and we will underline
the importance of developing new unique products with high value added per unit of land
using strongly immobile local resources. However, it should be noted that even though such
objectives are clearly within the reach of economic policy, history and economic theory tell
us that the size and specialization of an economy are very difficult to affect given the
strength of market mechanisms and the associated hysteresis effects. In any case, one
should not expect overnight results.
2 Some doubts on remoteness-reducing policies
The most visible structural handicap of the ultra-peripheral regions is certainly their sheer
remoteness from the European continent and, almost always, their insularity. Although
both of these handicaps have been somewhat alleviated by the secular improvements in
transportation technologies and ICT, which have put the ultra-peripheral regions more
clearly on the map by making them more accessible, there is no doubt that they are still
“remote”. In an economic sense, a market is “remote” when shipping to it from any location,
or shipping from it to any location, involves high monetary and time costs of transportation.
It is often put forward that one may expect that falling trade costs between the European
continent and the ultra-peripheral regions would lead to a gradual development of the latter
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by making firms there more competitive. This is why the European Commission proposes
for the period 2007–2013 additional funds in order to alleviate difficulties of access due to
extreme isolation. However, we voice three doubts about the success chances of such a
remoteness-reducing policy, at least when it is not combined with a direct and significant
development of local immobile assets: (i) Transport costs are likely to remain quite high
because of low volumes of trade between the outermost regions and the European continent;
(ii) in the short run, remoteness is a relative concept and the ongoing integration of the
internal market may offset any improvements of access from the ultra-peripheral regions;
and (iii) in the long run, falling trade costs and better access to the ultra-peripheral regions
are likely to harm them, both because more efficient outside firms can supplant domestic
industry by selling into their markets and because footloose production factors may relocate
to the larger markets to serve the periphery taking precisely advantage of the improved
access.
2.1 Transport costs are likely to remain high
First, one should note that reductions in transport costs in the international context often
arise because of density economies in commodity transportation. Roughly speaking, there
are density economies when a one percent increase in all outputs, holding network size,
production technology, and input prices constant, increases the firm’s cost by less than one
percent. Density economies are a prevalent features of many shipping modes, especially
air and maritime freight. It is indeed a well-documented fact that shipping costs are lower
on routes processing large volumes of freight and/or linked to hubs because specialized
services and large scale infrastructure can be profitably developed there (the increasing
containerization of world commodity trade provides a striking illustration of both aspects).
For example, Mori and Nishikimi (2002) observe that transport costs from Japan to a non
hub-port in Southeast Asia are approximately 23% higher than to a hub-port in the same
region, thus showing that density economies are far from being negligible. How to realize
those density economies in the context of the outermost regions is unclear because of the
low trade volumes. Furthermore, to exploit density economies by either air or maritime
freight requires shipping goods in both directions. Yet, this implies quite naturally that
there will be also more sales from outside firms at lower prices in the outermost regions,
which might hurt the development of a local industry.
2.2 The European continent is likely to remain a ‘fortress’
Even in a world where trade costs take low values, it should be clear that economic re-
moteness remains a relative concept : a market is more or less remote when compared to
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another set of markets. Consequently, any change in the geography of demand or supply
between two regions in the set of markets has a direct impact on all the other regions by
affecting the competitive environment there (‘third country effects’; Behrens et al., 2005).
The relativity of remoteness is especially important in assessing how the European inte-
gration process is bound to affect to outermost regions. Indeed, this integration process
largely changes all the relationships between the regional markets as barriers to trade are
gradually removed and as new member states join the EU. Although the specificities of
the outermost regions have been acknowledged by Article 299.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty,
the ongoing integration process is almost surely bound to hurt these regions’ export per-
formance. The reason is that economic integration seems to proceed more rapidly within
continental Europe than between Europe and the outermost regions, thereby placing them
at an additional competitive disadvantage by transforming Europe more and more into a
“Fortress” that is impenetrable for exports from the ultra-peripheral regions.2 It is our
contention that European integration and the current eastern enlargement certainly ad-
versely affect the access of the ultra-peripheral regions to the large European core markets.
Whether structural spending on infrastructure, transportation technologies, and ICT allow
to partly alleviate this problem is more than questionable. It is, indeed, unlikely that the
relative access of the outermost regions improves when compared to either the old or the
new member states. In some sense, one may argue that we face both an economic and a
semantic paradox since the ultra-peripheral (“situated on the edge”) regions are considered
as being part of the internal (“situated on the inside”) market.
2.3 Reducing remoteness: a double-edged sword?
Although improvements in transportation and communication links between the ultra-
peripheral regions and either the European continent or their regional markets appears to
be a tempting idea, one should keep in mind that infrastructure is a double-edged sword : it
allows domestic firms to easily export, yet conversely allows foreign firms to easily penetrate
the domestic market. Although the first effect favors regional development by strengthen-
ing the competitive position of domestic firms in foreign markets, production may relocate
in the long-run to these foreign markets due to the change in accessibility. There are two
reasons for this. First, firms can more easily sell into the domestic market from abroad
due to lower trade frictions; and, second, increased import competition erodes markups
and operating profits which, when combined with the small size of local markets in the
outermost regions, makes firms want to serve the larger market locally to cover more easily
fixed costs through increased operating profits. Improved accessibility therefore triggers a
2Head and Mayer (2001) analyze the “Fortress Europe” effect by focussing on how European integration
affects the export performance of U.S. and Japanese firms in a large number of sectors.
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“straw effect” and economic activity is sucked up by the large markets like orange juice in
a glass.3
Note, furthermore, that a sufficient decrease in trade costs may even make interregional
market access asymmetric in the sense that only firms established in the larger region can
profitably export to the smaller one. The intuition is that the competitive environment
in the larger markets is fiercer, because there are more firms in that market and these
firms are on average more productive (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005). In such a context, the
asymmetry in market access works as a very strong driver for relocation from the small
to the large regions, even though firms would have remained in the small region otherwise
(Behrens, 2005a). However, it should be underlined that falling trade costs for final goods
do not have the same effect on firm location than falling trade costs for intermediate goods.
As shown by Gaigne´ (2004), when transport costs for intermediate goods are high, firms
have an incentive to agglomerate in the larger country when transport costs for final goods
decrease. Under such conditions, producers of final goods can agglomerate into a region
to exploit scale economies and can serve profitably the other regions, whereas producers
of intermediate goods locate close to their industrial customers to increase their market
size. By contrast, when transport costs for final goods are high, a fall in transport costs
for intermediate goods favors the dispersion of the industrial production. Indeed, high
trade costs for final goods trigger the dispersion of producers of these goods, whereas
low trade costs of intermediate goods enable firms belonging to the intermediate sector
to profitably serve different markets from a single location. Thus, any assessment of how
integration may affect the outermost regions should carefully study the industrial structure
of those regions to identify the strength of the intermediate input linkages. Yet, given
that most of the outermost regions rely on a few relatively homogeneous export products
(e.g., bananas, dairy products, fishing, sugar cane), which do not appear to benefit from
significant intermediate linkages, the first scenario strikes us as being the more likely one.4
3Such relocations towards the larger markets have been frequently observed within countries after im-
provements of inter-regional infrastructure, e.g., in the Paris region or around Tokyo.
4The arguments developed in this subsection are relevant for industrial firms which may adjust the
location of their production in response to a change in trade costs. However, the effects of falling trans-
port costs for immobile activities (e.g., the production of agricultural products specific to the outermost
regions, or for tourism) is more ambiguous for regional development. Indeed, on the one hand, the com-
pensation scheme for the additional transport costs of agricultural products entailed by isolation from the
European market could yield positive gains for the outermost regions because agricultural production is
not geographical mobile. On the one hand, falling transport costs to the European market should raise the
profitability of basic investments in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, recent works have shown
that low transport costs of agricultural goods could trigger the agglomeration of industrial production in
core regions (Fujita et al., 1999, ch. 7). Consequently, gains arising from the larger size of the agricultural
sector in the outermost regions due to decreasing transport costs of agricultural products could be, in the
long run, dampened by the declining size of the industrial sector in these regions.
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2.4 Some policy implications
To summarize the arguments pertaining to remoteness-reducing policies, one should keep in
mind that better accessibility for the outermost regions is a necessary condition to promote
development, but it is by no means a sufficient one. Furthermore, it is probably illusory to
expect to attract footloose activities to the outermost regions by improving transportation
links (which may not even be possible in the first place). On the contrary, the relocation of
such activities to the European continent is the more likely outcome in the long-run, given
the current configuration and the prevailing market forces.
Our analysis hints at two strategies that could be implemented:
1. Given the increasing integration of the European market, one possibility for the ultra-
peripheral regions would be to recenter their activity on tying closer links with the trading
partners in their geographical areas. Hence, a profitable strategy could be to favor economic
integration with the neighboring countries and to increase access to other trading areas,
which are close to South America and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries.
This is currently one aim of the European Union that will be implemented by reducing
the barriers restricting exchanges with very close geographical markets of the Caribbean,
the Americas, and Africa. By encouraging their integration into the surrounding region,
the outermost regions could expand their closer foreign markets and reduce the effects of
remoteness from the European core markets. Preferential agreements between the European
Union and non-member countries close to the outermost regions could be applied which,
however, must be compatible with WTO and internal market rules. For example, the
reduction of trade barriers on intermediate goods from ACP countries or America could
promote production in the outermost regions.
2. In addition, just as Hong-Kong in the case of China, the outermost regions could play
the role of nodes, or entrepoˆts, linking different regional trading agreements and provid-
ing transshipment and distribution services. Inside an interconnected transport network,
shared-shipment nodes are known to often reap advantage. According to Tongzon (2002),
Singapore derives its advantage of shared-shipment precisely from being an entrepoˆt. The
total annual revenue of port-dependent firms in Singapore, surveyed in 1991, accounted
for 21.5% of GDP for that same year, and currently, more than two thirds of Singapore’s
container traffic is transshipped from neighboring ports. However, technological advantage,
along with geographical advantage, is a crucial factor for an entrepoˆt in the network to
secure a strategic role. Thus, national governments and the European Union must invest
much effort on developing the ports as well as related facilities. In addition, if an outermost
region becomes a shared-shipment region, trade volumes will increase significantly and, in
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turn, unit transport costs will fall because of density economies in transportation (see Sec-
tion 2.1). As a by-product, agricultural activities established in this region could benefit
from a better accessibility to the Europe continent and other core markets.
3 Increasing economic size
Remoteness and market size are inextricably linked. For example, in the absence of trade
due to prohibitive transport costs, even the smaller region can host a more than propor-
tionate share of firms provided that its immobile population size is not too low and that the
goods are sufficiently differentiated (Behrens, 2004; 2005b). In addition, a disadvantageous
geographical location per se is not incompatible with a region hosting a large share of pro-
duction (Behrens et al., 2006). However, when the local market size is small, remoteness
constitutes a significant locational disadvantage.
As is well known, the EU pattern is such that the continent is the big ‘core’, whereas
the ultra-peripheral regions are the very small ‘periphery’. One idea that naturally comes
to one’s mind is that it may be possible to accelerate economic development by increasing
the economic size of a region. This point is developed in this section where we analyze
two different strategies which may increase the economic size of the outermost regions:
(i) increasing local demand through transfers of purchasing power; and (ii) favoring the
development of new differentiated products using largely immobile resources. The first
strategy is equivalent to a demand-side based policy, as largely implemented by the EU in
the past; whereas the second is a supply-side based policy, which is more in line with the
recent strategies set out in the Lisbon agenda.
3.1 Increasing market size: a hopeless endeavor?
There are two basic ways (or a combination of them) to boost local demand: to increase
local spending and consumers’ purchasing power, or to reduce internal trade costs.5
5Immigration may also be viewed as a tool to increase market size. Such a strategy is surely bound to
fail and, if anything, economic theory tells us that migrants “follow market potential” and will, therefore,
flow from the ultra-peripheral regions to the European continent (Crozet, 2006). Note also that policies
which aim at increasing the level of general human capital may prove extremely counter-productive. Indeed,
numerous empirical studies have shown that the probability of emigration to core markets rises with the
education level. Thus, an increase in the education level of a growing fraction of the population in the
outermost regions could induce the more skilled to leave those regions. The argument is the same as in
the previous section: increasing the mobility of production factors, or favoring accessibility, will most likely
backfire. As we argue later, improving the level of location-specific human capital is much more efficient
as this capital cannot relocate and, thus, is not affected by a deepening integration.
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3.1.1 Purchasing power transfers are too weak to counteract market forces
All outermost regions are characterized by a small local market size, both in terms of pop-
ulation and purchasing power.6 Channeling funds into these regions to artificially increase
market size, influence the location decisions of firms, and increase productivity may prove
inefficient. At least, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that this is the case in
continental Europe, where the peripheral regions do not seem to catch up whereas intra-
country core-periphery patterns remain fairly stable (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Puga, 2002;
Combes and Overman, 2004). An undesirable by-product of redistributive policies is that
production efficiency is jeopardized as firms locate counter to economic determinants. As is
furthermore well known, expenditure-driven redistributive policies do not deliver adequate
results in an increasingly globalized world economy, while it is worth stressing once more
that market forces are very strong. A particularly illuminating example is provided by the
German post-reunification experience which, despite a huge amount of money channeled
into it, did not succeed in making East Germany catch up with the rest of Germany.7 This
is surprising since former East Germany is neither remote, nor small, nor geographically or
climatically disfavored, yet the expected development did not take place as firms relocated
massively to West Germany or simply went out of business. This is even more surprising
since it highlights the asymmetric nature and the lock-in (the irreversibility) of geographical
economic processess. Indeed, as shown by Redding and Sturm (2006), the border cities in
West Germany were initially hurt by the isolation of the eastern part after World War II.
Yet, opening the border after the reunification did not lead again to a catching up, as the
eastern market was quite small and not attractive after 40 years of planned economy.
We may thus safely state that the lock-in generated by market forces is very strong,
thereby inhibiting almost completely the impacts of regional development policies based on
the (distortionary) redistribution of purchasing power.
3.1.2 Reducing internal transport costs in the outermost regions
The internal market size of the outermost regions could also be improved by favoring
agglomeration of its mobile production activities (Krugman, 1991). We know from ‘new
economic geography’ that agglomeration can be promoted by either low internal transport
6The Canary Islands have the largest local market with a population of about 1700000 and a GDP per
capita of about 91% of the EU-25 average (Figures from the organizer’s MACRORUP report, 2006).
7“East Germany with massive support from West Germany has in a decade moved up from 40% to 60%
of the West German GDP per head. But such levels of support will not accompany EU enlargement”,
and certainly not ultra-peripheral regions (Source: David Pichaud, March 29, 2002, BBC News Europe;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1901293.stm). As argued by Hunt (2006, p.3) “West Ger-
many has sent at least 4% of its GDP to East Germany every year from 1991-2005”, a total of about e1
trillion. Yet, population has fallen, GDP grown slowly and jobs have been lost.
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costs or high external costs (Behrens et al., forthcoming). Turning to the improvements of
internal infrastructure, such improvements may prove especially efficient for the outermost
regions. Indeed, decreasing the costs of moving goods and people within those regions
amounts de facto to increasing their internal market size, as less resources are wasted
for transportation and distribution and may be allocated to production per se (Martin
and Rogers, 1995). This could be especially fruitful in the case of the outermost regions
composed of several small islands, for which the costs of shipping goods across islands are
comparatively high when compared to other areas. As a beneficial by-product of a reduction
in internal transport costs, the market becomes more competitive, thereby reducing the
outside impact of foreign firms and strengthening the position of domestic firms thus turning
the “Fortress effect” penalizing the outermost regions on the European continent to their
advantage at home.
Furthermore, the reduction of internal transport costs and the associated increase in
the size of the internal market may give rise to other advantages: (i) reducing foreign
firms’ penetration capacity (e.g., Behrens et al., forthcoming); (ii) boosting productivity
via external effects, driven by increased agglomeration (e.g., Rosenthal and Strange, 2004);8
(iii) a finer division of labor, boosting productivity (e.g., Duranton and Puga, 2004); (iv)
an increase in the number of firms and of varieties (Gaigne´, 2006); and (v) the selection of
more efficient firms (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005).
3.2 Expanding the product range and using targeted investments
One feature which all the outermost regions share is an excessive reliance on a few relatively
homogeneous products. These regions are, indeed, largely specialized in a small number of
agricultural products and also in fisheries, particularly the French oversea departments and
the Azores.9 Industrial production is also concentrated in a small number of sectors: the
agrofood industry and industries dealing with primary sector inputs. These sectors rely on
8It is worth pointing out that Madeira and the Canary Islands are the best performing ultra-peripheral
regions of the EU, which fare better than the rest. Although this may be partly due to the fact that they
are located closer to the European continent and “relatively close” to their capitals, we believe that another
factor explains their relatively good economic performance: both have a high population density, whereas
the Canary Islands also have a relatively large local population.
9In Martinique, Guadeloupe and Re´union, production of sugar cane and/or bananas accounts for over
three quarters of the cultivated agricultural area. In French Guyana, rice production accounts for 40% of
the cultivated agricultural area, whereas on the Canary Islands five crops account for over three quarters
of the cultivated agricultural area and of the value of crop production. On the Azores, production consists
mainly in raising cattle, mainly for dairy products and meat (animal production accounts for over three
quarters of final agricultural produce).
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fairly traditional technologies and export a very low share of their production.10 This lack
of diversification leaves the outermost regions vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.
In addition, the specialization in agricultural products in the outermost regions is ex-
tremely fragile. Indeed, production for export (mainly tropical and sub-tropical produce)
faces tough competition from the ACP countries and the Mediterranean basin, both of
which sell a lot in the European market. Local agriculture is also heavily dependent on
the outside world for input supplies (fertilisers, seeds, . . .) and remote from the sources
of supply. Further, the development of extensive agricultural is slowed down by the lack
of arable land due to small surface and the increasing urbanisation of rural areas. In the
Canary Islands, Madeira, Martinique and Guadeloupe, there is also strong competition for
land from the tourism sector. Finally, although the subsidization of agriculture in the out-
ermost regions remains very significant (through the POSEI programmes of the European
Union), public subsidies for farmers are decreasing and it is unlikely that there will be any
reversal in this long-run trend.
Despite those structural handicaps, one opportunity for developing the outermost re-
gions could be an investment in niche products that primarily rely on immobile local factors,
when combined with investments in location-specific human capital, the right infrastructural
investments, and the right legal framework. The production of new products may be an
efficient way to foster economic development in the long run, provided that such products
(i) are very differentiated, (ii) mobilize a large array of relatively immobile local resources,
(iii) benefit from a brand name tied to the location (eventually via a legal framework), and
(iv) have high value added per unit of land required because of the lack of arable land.
The penetration of foreign markets in the presence of high transport costs faced by the
outermost regions, requires that the goods be relatively differentiated from those sold in
the single European market. It is known from industrial organization theory that price
competition in the case of relatively homogeneous goods is especially fierce, in particular
on world markets given the current wave of international integration. As Fujita (2006) put
it: “if farmers were to continue producing only generic goods, they would have no way of
escaping from the direct competition in price and cost. Then, given the increasingly more
severe competition in the commodities markets due to globalization and expanding domestic
markets, farmers (except those in the most advantageous locations) would be able to survive
only under increasing subsidies and protection, while suffering from the gradual decline in
their wages and incomes.” (Fujita, 2006, pp. 2-3). Product differentiation enables firms to
relax price competition and to more easily absorb transport costs and penetrate the foreign
markets.
10High export-share sectors include rum for the French oversea departments, tobacco for the Canary
Islands, and milk for the Azores.
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Fujita (2006) has recently shown how remote rural regions in Japan and other parts of
the world have significantly boosted their economic development by specializing in niche
products and ‘brand agriculture’.11 To do so successfully requires three basic ingredients: (i)
an exploitation of relatively immobile region-specific assets, including natural, human and
intellectual resources; (ii) a timely investment in infrastructural projects and ICT, possibly
with the outside help of the EU; and (iii) a continuing improvement and accumulation of
location-specific human capital that serves in the exploitation of the immobile region-specific
assets to create and improve highly differentiated products that can be competitively sold
in remote markets even in the presence of high trade costs and small local market size.
Finally, some legal protection of the brands may be required, as it is possible to make some
products immobile by tying them to a particular region.
Why is such a development strategy susceptible to work? First, it emphasizes the
improvement and exploitation of local immobile resources. Therefore, an improvement in
accessibility is not likely to lead to a relocation as the resources are specific to the region.
Second, it focuses on the investment and improvement of human capital applied to the
exploitation of these region-specific resources. Thus, since it is not general human capital,
there is again a lesser chance for relocation as this capital cannot be readily used in a
different context. All this implies that targeted improvements in infrastructure and ICT
are not very likely to backfire, since (i) the additional import competition will not affect
the highly differentiated goods; and (ii) the local resources are not likely to relocate, since
they are used together with local and largely immobile resources. Finally, in case there is
some competition coming from outside regions which specialize in the same brands, legal
actions backed by the European Union to protect the brands produced in the outermost
regions may prove useful.12
Note that such development strategies are already pioneered in several regions. For
example, the French DOM La Re´union produces wine and markets it under a specific
brand that recently obtained the label “Appellation controˆle´e” and “vin de pays”. The
production is now of about 50000 bottles per year, which are marketed via Internet and
shipped on a regular basis to foreign countries, including the European market. Note that
the climate allows for two vintages per year, thereby boosting productivity when compared
11This movement, initiated in a decentralized way by the remote villages themselves, is known as the
OVOP (One village, one product) movement, which originated in Japan with the aim of developing remote
rural regions. Since then, it has been adopted successfully in several developing countries, whereas results
in some other countries have not been very satisfying.
12The European system relying on regional protected brands (‘Appellation re´gionale prote´ge´e’) may prove
useful. A recent example is provided by the greek Feta cheese, which can no longer be produced in member
countries like Germany and sold under that brand name. This allows Greek producers in relatively remote
regions to benefit from some monopoly power and to sell their cheese more competitively in the European
core markets.
12
to other vinyards that have only a single vintage per year. Although transport costs are
quite high, this wine seems to sell reasonably well.
4 Tentative conclusions and outlook
Investigating the economic questions pertaining to the outermost regions of Europe is a
challenging task as the standard tools of economic geography are hard to adapt to match
their specific realities. As argued in the foregoing, the development of these regions most
probably has to rely heavily on locally available and immobile resources, most of which are
linked to brand agriculture and/or tourism and services. Yet, a cursory glance at standard
development economics and economic geography reveals that the agricultural sector plays
only a marginal role in these literatures. It is put in the background, as development is
perceived to stem mainly from the secondary and the tertiary sectors only (Fujita, 2006).
In this respect, economic development and regional economics utterly fail to come to grips
with the issues under scrutiny and the specific reality faced by the outermost regions.
To summarize our foregoing results, we do not believe that either infrastructural im-
provements or regional income transfers constitute by themselves viable options for achiev-
ing regional development of the ultra-peripheral regions in the light of what economic
geography teaches us. Improvements in infrastructure and trade costs are most likely to
backfire on the regions, since market access remains highly asymmetric. Although mea-
sures intended to artifically increase market size are implementable, the gains stemming
from doing so would probably be low given the financial means one has at its disposal. Yet,
the picture is not as gloomy as it may seem, since different viable development strategies
could be implemented in our opinion:
1. Favoring economic integration with the neighbouring countries and increasing the ac-
cess to other trading areas, which are close to the Americas and the ACP countries.
2. Some outermost regions could play the role of shared-shipment nodes between neigh-
bouring countries and the European Union.
3. Reducing internal transport costs of commodities and people, as this may allow to
make the regional markets more competitive and yield agglomeration gains.
4. The development of highly diffrentiated products using location-specific factors and
immobile assets, when combined with timely infrastructural and ICT investments.
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Finally, we must recognize that even if such strategies are expected to foster the development
of the ultra-peripheral regions, history and economic theory teaches us that the size and
specialization of an economy are something very difficult to affect given the strength of the
market mechanisms and the hysteris effects. Although the development of the outermost
regions is not beyond the reach of economic policy, one should not expect quick results.
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